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1. Introduction 
Let us explore the ways in which societal provision for the future is affected by different 
types of entrepreneurial action. While individuals provide for the future through the act of 
saving, private entrepreneurs employ the resources provided by savers to profitably 
maintain the resource base that makes future consumption possible.2 The maintenance of 
this resource base represents capital maintenance on the part of entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurs are motivated to maintain capital by the urgency of sustaining of future 
enterprise income (Brätland 2006, 30). This income is earned through the competitive 
process of better serving consumers through the sale of desired goods and services. 
Moreover, entrepreneurial income is critical in providing the means by which salaries and 
wages are paid and, in this sense, represents a critical provision for society’s future. This 
happy symbiosis is made possible by institutions that support private property and 
voluntary monetary transactions.  
Can these fundamentally entrepreneurial institutions have broader potential implications in 
addressing society’s concerns about the future quality of life? The entrepreneur can only 
function effectively in a market economy in which business enterprises are able to obtain 
secure rights of private property and in which transactions are conducted in a commonly 
accepted medium of exchange. To the extent that these conditions are realized, private 
entrepreneurial enterprises can play a critical and decisive role in (1) warding off what some 
see as global resource exhaustion, and (2) maintaining what is currently viewed as public 
infrastructure. 
But with respect to replenishing exhausting resources and the maintenance of infrastructure, 
the operative institutions are not designed to support this entrepreneurial process of 
                                                 
1 John Brätland is a senior economist with the U.S. Department of the Interior in Washington, D.C. 
Views expressed in the paper are strictly those of the author. 
2 A reviewer of this paper has noted the need to clarify the use of the term resources. In the first part of 
the paper dealing with extractive resources, the use of the term is refers to those extractive resources 
commonly thought to be ‘exhaustible.’ However, in the latter part of the paper dealing with issues 
bearing on infrastructure maintenance, the intended use of the term ‘resources’ could include strategic 
capabilities that may emerge from complementarity uses of factors of production (Mathews 1996, 88-
92).  
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providing for society’s future. This inquiry reveals that attenuated and constrained property 
rights represent impediments to resource renewal (Brätland 2006, 34-35). Also, 
governmental institutions and career oriented entrepreneurial activity on the part of 
legislators and bureaucrats can be detrimental to the attainment of infrastructure 
maintenance. Moreover, these latter institutions and activities are obstacles to the role that 
entrepreneurial action can play in their attainment.  
The paper addresses the following question: can the private entrepreneur play a more 
decisive role in addressing society’s long term concerns for the future? In answering this 
question, this paper explores the broader potential social benefits of private entrepreneurial 
capital maintenance activities and the institutional impediments that currently thwart the 
capacity of market activity to perform that beneficent role. Societal provision for the future 
is found to be contingent on the degree to which the relevant resources can become 
privatized income earning property. The monetized income stream assures their 
maintenance and replacement by private entrepreneurs.  
2. Resource exhaustion or entrepreneurial capital maintenance?  
The role of extractive resources in the economy has been obscured by a myth of exhaustion. 
By looking at resources from a global perspective, the certainty of exhaustion would seem to 
be self evident. Extractive resources must exist in fixed ultimate supply just as the crust of 
the earth itself is finite. However, viewed at the microeconomic level, different insights 
begin to emerge. Some writers have correctly noted that at the microeconomic level there is 
a replacement process that occurs as individual deposits are depleted. However, there has 
been little attention paid to the fundamentally entrepreneurial nature of this process and the 
way in which it is, in essence, a matter of capital maintenance for the individual extractive 
enterprise. A fuller understanding of this capital maintenance process highlights one of the 
ways in which the entrepreneur is critical to societal provision for the future. However, this 
understanding also reveals the extent to which man made institutions are impediments to 
this particular aspect of capital maintenance.  
2.1 The neglected role of the entrepreneur in resource renewal 
The entrepreneur does not appear in the economics of exhaustible resources. This absence is 
implicitly evident in the common assumption that a pre-defined global stock of a particular 
the extractive resource is fixed. Moreover, the economic theory of exhaustible resources is 
cast in an equilibrium mode in which the entrepreneur does not exist in any meaningful 
sense. But in reality, the economics of exhaustible resource availability is fundamentally 
entrepreneurial. In an entrepreneurial world, the notion of an aggregate fixed stock of a 
resource has no coherent meaning. Extractive enterprises are by definition entrepreneurial 
and the known extractive deposits under the enterprise’s management are among the 
capital goods employed by the firm to maintain or increase the firm’s income (Brätland 
2008, 386-393). Hence, the feared phenomenon of aggregate exhaustion has no particular 
validity in a market environment in which entrepreneurs, with secure access to exploratory 
ventures seek to maintain enterprise capital by replacing depleting deposits through 
investments in exploration and development of new deposits. The efficacy of this process is 
demonstrated by the fact that proven reserves of virtually all extractive resources are higher 
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today than they were 50 or even 100 years ago. In those rare instances in which reserves 
have not increased, the reason is found in the fact that the resource is no longer demanded.  
Entrepreneurial replacement of exhausting resources is one example of capital maintenance 
for the extractive enterprise (Brätland 2008, 376). It occurs routinely because gradual 
depletion of deposits reduces the operating revenue margins of extractive enterprises. Since 
capital maintenance is always about maintaining enterprise income, the firm is constantly 
replacing its depleting resource deposits through acquisition of exploration rights, discovery 
and development of new deposits. Hence, replacement of resource deposits is only 
contingent on the prospective profitability of doing so. In this sense, the process of resource 
replacement is not dissimilar from the conventional replacement of depreciated capital 
goods. But this reality means that anticipated shortages of extractive resources reflected in 
prices would be a principal inducement of deposit replacement. The means by which 
resources are replaced emerges out of the entrepreneur’s judgment of how enterprise 
income is affected by alternative prospective replacement strategies. This resource-
replacement process is fundamentally entrepreneurial and is dependent upon access to land 
and managerial flexibility in maintaining capital and entrepreneurial income. 
2.2 Strategies of capital maintenance by extractive enterprises 
Social concern over so called exhaustible resources has been conditioned by the notion that 
there is a global stock that once depleted is gone forever (Bradley 2007, 87). However, in 
reality, the idea of an existing global stock of an extractive resource is really meaningless. 
The actual relevance of depleting stocks is found in the actions and strategies of 
entrepreneurs to maintain enterprise capital. Alternative strategies to maintain 
entrepreneurial capital would include a comparison of the expected present worth of 
income that may accrue over differing time horizons.  In making these comparisons, the 
entrepreneurial enterprise would make subjective judgments of the respective risks and 
uncertainties associated with each strategy. At any moment in time, the extractive firm has 
numerous investment opportunities that involve immediate efforts to explore, develop and 
extract resources. The following investment strategies would be a form of capital 
maintenance that reflects societal provision for the future: 
1. Engage in entrepreneurial delay with respect to (a) acquisition of additional exploration 
rights (leases), (b) additional exploratory efforts on owned leases,3 (c) investment in 
development on owned leases, and (d) production of the resource from developed 
leases already owned by the extractive enterprise (Brätland 2008, 390).  
2. Extract deposits but maintain capital by reinvesting proceeds in competing capital 
goods offering a greater rate of return but which may not be directly related to the 
extraction of resources (Brätland 2008, 392).  
As noted, these strategies for capital maintenance involve an uncertain time profile of 
prospective revenues and financial outlays which means that choices made from among 
these options will involve due allowance for time preference and uncertainty. Moreover, 
opportunity costs of these alternatives will be subjective and unique to the individual 
                                                 
3 An exploratory effort can be viewed as successful if the firm making the discovery considers it to be a 
realistic candidate for eventual development and production. 
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extractive firm. In fact, for the extractive firm making a choice of one of these strategies, the 
opportunity costs will necessarily include a subjective reckoning of the entrepreneurial 
income thought to be obtainable from the next most profitable relinquished strategy 
(Buchanan 1969, 49-50). 
A few additional words of clarification may be important with respect to these options. 
Firms engaged in extraction are always in search of new and more profitable deposits to 
replace depleting extractive-resource deposits. In choosing a capital maintenance strategy, 
the extractive firm compares the marginal expected opportunity cost of finding, developing 
and exploiting new deposits with the marginal expected opportunity cost of developing and 
extracting an existing known deposit. If the former costs are less that the latter, a decision to 
find new deposits promises a greater yield in terms of entrepreneurial income. The 
extractive firm would be inclined to pursue this strategy if the quality (lower cost) of new 
deposits were superior to those already under the firm’s immediate control. One important 
aspect of this strategy is that it would reflect a decision on the part of the extractive firm to 
deliberately delay exploration or development of the property and resources to which it 
already has access on existing leases. In other words, the firm would be exercising 
entrepreneurial latitude in the timing of exploration or development on its existing leases. 
Also the extractive firm could purchase from other firms leases containing discovered but 
undeveloped deposits and then immediately embarking upon development and extraction 
of these deposits. But again, such a strategy may reflect a decision to exercise 
entrepreneurial delay with respect to prospects on leases already under the firm’s control. 
Deposits already under the firm’s control may be low-quality, high-cost properties in which 
case delay may well be the best course of action.  
Delay as noted in strategy (1) would commonly be premised on an expectation that the 
capital value of a project would be greater if it were delayed until some time in the future. 
While such deliberate delay could be based on expectations of longer-term rising trends in 
the price of the resources itself, it may also reflect the extractive enterprise’s efforts to 
manage costs of a prospective project. Delay may enhance the income of the extractive 
enterprise by lowering the opportunity costs associated with the respective stages of 
investment in a planned project. In particular, such delay may be helpful in avoiding cost 
increases from bottlenecks that are likely to be encountered in regulatory efforts to expedite 
exploration and development. 4 In the context of capital maintenance by the extractive firm, 
any reduction in cost may significantly enhance prospective entrepreneurial income and in 
the process make provision for the future by conserving resources. But again, in a 
disequilibrium setting, such delaying actions would be undertaken strictly on the basis of 
entrepreneurial judgments. 
                                                 
4 As this insight applies to production in general, see Alchian (1959, 23-40). Alchian’s observation is 
borne out in the research on leasing of Federal offshore lands on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS); 
Walter Mead and his colleagues note the following:... 
"If development of the resource is required in a short period of time, bottlenecks would surely develop 
in acquiring the skilled labor and specialized capital equipment ... by allowing more time for lease 
development, the labor and capital equipment markets can respond to increased demand for these 
inputs with increased production at prices lower than those that would prevail under more pressing 
time constraints" (Mead et.al. 1985, 110-112). 
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But an extractive enterprise may choose delay for reasons bearing largely on volatility in the 
price of the resource. The different stages of the production process accord ownership of 
successive series of capital goods each of which represents a type of investment ‘option.’ 
Ownership of any investment option represents a right but not an obligation to proceed 
further with the next in a sequence of investment opportunities. In this case, this sequence of 
capital goods includes (a) exploration rights for particular lands, (b) discovered resources (c) 
developed resources, and (d) extracted resources ready to be sold. Each of these capital 
goods has a market value. Volatility in the price of the resource itself would be reflected in 
volatility in the market worth of each of these capital goods. The volatility in the price of the 
resource would enhance the market value of each of these four capital goods but this 
increase in value is contingent on the extractive firm’s ability to delay action on each next 
phase of investment. For example, in undertaking investment in exploration, the capital 
good sought would be discovered resources. These discovered but undeveloped resources are 
marketable and have a price and represent a type of option to acquire developed resources. 
And, in turn, by committing to subsequent investment in development, the entrepreneurial 
enterprise would be seeking capital goods in the form of developed resources. At each 
successive stage, the extractive firm will find it advantageous to delay any further 
commitment to the project until evolving market conditions reveal more information about 
the future and the potential profitability of the next investment option.5 This advantage is 
reflected in an enhanced market value of each of the capital goods and the extraction project 
as a whole (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, 4: Cowen 1997, 26). Hence, decisions to delay are critical 
in maintaining the capital value of the extractive firm and in conserving affected resources. 
Strategy (2) emphasizes the point that capital maintenance for all entrepreneurial enterprises 
requires investment in those capital goods that offer the greatest likelihood of attaining or 
maintaining profitability. The strategy highlights the reason that cost minimization in the 
replacement of physical capital goods is not necessarily equivalent to capital maintenance. 
The real motivation for investment to maintain capital is not to minimize cost of replacing 
particular capital goods but to increase income (Hayek 2007 [1941], 277-278). In the case of 
strategy (2), the two may be quite different since ‘cost’ minimization (or expense 
minimization) does not take into account returns that could be achievable by investment in 
capital goods that may not be directly related to the firm’s historical specialization. 
Such a shift in the physical composition of capital goods sought in capital maintenance 
could be prompted by newly revealed changes or previously unrecognized entrepreneurial 
opportunities in other markets. F.A. Hayek captures the entrepreneurial motivations for 
such shifts in investment: “… when we proceed to consider in detail the reaction of 
capitalists to unforeseen changes, … we go back to the rationale of maintaining capital intact, 
the quantity of capital drops right out of the picture as a directly relevant magnitude. Its 
place is taken by a direct consideration of the size of the income streams that may be 
expected at different dates” (Hayek. 2007 [1941], 280): italics in the original text). It is in this 
sense that a focus on the physical replacement of resource deposits conveys a misleading 
interpretation of the investments necessary to maintain capital for the extractive firm. But 
the converse of these preceding observations is that investment by all firms, within or 
                                                 
5 Interestingly enough, each successive stage of investment in the project imparts a successively higher 
market price to the project itself since these properties are traded between firms.  
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outside of the extractive industries, will be sensitive to any anticipated higher returns that 
may be achievable as a consequence of anticipated scarcities of particular extractive 
resources. 
The extractive firm may be constrained in its choice of replacement investments by realities 
of ‘capital-good complementarity.’ An extractive enterprise’s grouping of capital goods 
would normally be in the form of resource deposits or assets related to the extractive 
activity such as processing or transportation. If the enterprise were to invest in capital goods 
not necessarily related to extraction, it would be mindful of the degree to which such capital 
goods were complementary to assets comprising its existing operations. The most important 
issue would not necessarily be an issue of physical complementarity of capital goods. 
Expected profitability would always establish economic complementarity and would 
supersede issues that may bear on physical complementarity of capital goods already within 
the enterprise. The central concern for the enterprise is the extent to which the particular 
investment alternative promises the largest addition to entrepreneurial income for the 
enterprise as a whole (Brätland 2008, 393). But while the individual enterprise is focused on 
future income, the societal consequence is that resources are conserved for the future.  
2.3 Impediments to entrepreneurial capital maintenance by extractive firms 
Although capital maintenance refutes the exhaustion myth, this refutation hinges on access 
to lands, entrepreneurial latitude in managing resources, and secure rights of private 
property. But institutions of governmental control and jurisprudence hinder entrepreneurial 
actions of extractive firms striving to maintain capital. These hindrances include: (a) 
foreclosure of land access because of government control of mineral lands; (b) curtailment of 
entrepreneurial latitude arising from court-imposed covenants that define and enforce 
obligations to surface owners; and (c) in the case of petroleum, the extractive firm’s inability 
to acquire full control and ownership of reservoirs that it has discovered. The first of these 
impediments bears on access to land and the latter two impede extractive firms’ ability to 
manage resources as capital assets.  
 Land access by entrepreneurs foreclosed by government ownership 
Maintenance of entrepreneurial income requires a replacement of the capital goods critical 
to continued operation within the same industry. This entrepreneurial process requires that 
the firm have access to new resources that may be extractible at lower cost. Resource 
replacement is usually dependent upon leasing arrangements between surface owners and 
entrepreneurial firms seeking to find and develop new deposits. Through an unhampered 
market process, resources tend to gravitate to their highest valued use. The one obstacle 
facing the entrepreneurial extractive firm in its efforts to maintain capital is that properties 
are controlled by landowners that totally foreclose access rights to extractive firms. These 
owners are invariably governments that have merely nationalized lands through acts of 
political power without any actions establishing legitimate ownership (Bradley 1996, 76). 
Once these lands are under the political control of governments, access is established 
through a political process. In modern democracies, this conflict is manifested in political 
struggles to marshal the power of legislatures to assure certain politically popular uses of 
lands and foreclose less popular uses.  
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This political selection of popular uses of nationalized lands is one of the more pernicious 
features of democratic processes. Once lands are nationalized, alternative uses of these lands 
are chosen with the intent of appeasing ‘stakeholders.’ For the purposes of this inquiry, the 
important question is: who is a stakeholder with respect to the use of public lands? 
Unfortunately, political self-selection is the only criterion used to establish who has a 
legitimate ‘stake’ in decisions on alternative uses of government lands. Stakeholders are 
voters with diverse and subjective views on what for them constitutes an environmental 
amenity and the way in which they are affected by its presence or absence. But this political 
process takes the focus off legitimate environmental issues and, instead, motivates allocative 
decisions on the basis of the political placation of certain self-selected political constituencies 
(Brätland 2004, 528-532). This participatory process has little to do with rational 
environmental policy or the commitment of resources to their highest valued use. 
Political advocates of policies that foreclose access are unencumbered by the opportunity 
costs of such sanctions. In this sense, choosing and hence forsaking the value of the next 
most highly valued opportunity never impinges upon the actions of non-owning 
bureaucrats, politicians or environmentalists seeking to foreclose certain uses of government 
lands. Problems of resource exhaustion and a failure of firms to replace resources deposits 
can arise from the fact that the weighing of opportunity costs by political constituencies 
plays virtually no role in foreclosing lands to exploration and development. In bearing little 
of the opportunity costs of political foreclosure of access, self-selected stakeholders have 
incentives to become extremists in exaggerating preferences and overstating claims. 
Whatever the benefits of foreclosing exploration and development may be, these benefits are 
provided as ‘free goods’ through the process of political control that forecloses actions that 
provide for the future. 
 Entrepreneurial latitude foreclosed by obligations to surface owners 
The preceding discussion also highlights the fact that the extractive firm must have ample 
timing latitude if resource replacement is to be successful. But an early juridical declaration 
of surface owner rights has tended to preclude this entrepreneurial latitude in maintaining 
capital. An interpretation of the land surface owner’s rights to subsurface minerals was first 
enunciated by the British jurist, William Blackstone: “land hath also, in its legal 
specification, an indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards....downwards, whatever 
is in direct line between the surface of any land and the center of the earth....if a man grants 
all his lands, he thereby grants all mines of metal and other fossils. This [principle of 
ownership] is incorporated in the fundamental law of the land” (Blackstone. 1983, 18; also 
quoted in Bradley 1996, 70).  
The modern day implication of this interpretation of the surface owner’s rights is that the 
surface owner is entitled to a fixed percentage royalty on the gross proceeds from the sale of 
the extracted mineral.6 But under this entitlement, the surface owner and the extractive 
enterprise are confronted with mutually and fundamentally incompatible objectives. 
                                                 
6 Usually the surface owner is the also the owner of royalties; however, situations exist in which royalty 
streams are sold as investment assets. In other instances, the surface owner’s property rights may not 
include mineral rights in which case presumptive royalty obligations are owed to the owner of those 
rights. 
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Uncertainty and economic change mean that entrepreneurial latitude is always critical in 
managing capital goods including mineral leases. The management of mineral leases as 
capital goods requires timing of lease activities so that capital value of entrepreneurial 
income is maximized. However, the fixed percentage royalty on gross proceeds to which the 
surface owner is ‘entitled’ means that present value of royalty income is almost always 
diminished by entrepreneurial timing decisions on the part of lessees. Hence, any the 
surface owner will want to see the extraction operation managed so that royalty revenue is 
captured as quickly as possible (Brätland. 2001, 694-695).7 In brief, entrepreneurial timing of 
activity on the part of the lessee is critical to the maintenance of capital but is anathema to 
surface-owner interests. But the surface owner’s financial rights are protected by court-
imposed implied covenants that foreclose any action or lack of action that delays or 
diminishes the surface owner’s receipt of royalties. Hence, by not allowing entrepreneurial 
latitude in the timing of these activities, the covenants reduce the net present value of 
mineral resources and impede the ability of the extractive enterprise to maintain capital and 
conserve the resource for future use (Brätland 2001, 694).  
 Blockage to entrepreneurial ownership of petroleum discoveries 
The Blackstone declaration of surface ownership rights presented difficulties in its application 
to in situ petroleum and the unusual characteristics of petroleum deposits. The migratory 
nature of petroleum means that resources can be extracted from the reservoir in a manner that 
draws the resource from beneath the land of several different surface owners. Hence, a rule-of-
capture has evolved such that a discovered reservoir never becomes a capital good to be managed by 
the entrepreneurial firm. The rule of capture applies irrespective of the fact that the petroleum 
resources may have migrated from beneath another surface owner’s property.  
In the case of petroleum lands, the application of Blackstonian Principles has not meant that 
the owner of the surface also owns subsurface petroleum (Bradley 1996, 60-62). However, it 
does mean that the surface owner is always entitled to a percentage share of gross 
production or a percentage share of the gross sales proceeds of production. Again, to this 
end, the courts have imposed the covenants mentioned above to protect the financial 
interests of the surface owner. The consequence of the covenants is that the royalty-owning 
surface owner essentially precludes the management of petroleum leases as capital assets 
which, in turn, retards the entrepreneurial replacement of the resource. In so doing, the 
implied covenants dissipate entrepreneurial income by compelling exploration, 
development and production on expedited schedules that may be inconsistent with the 
conservation of the resource. Moreover, mandates to undertake these activities at an earlier 
moment in time means that the opportunity cost associated with these activities will, in 
almost all cases, be increased (Mead, et. al. 1985, 110-112). Under circumstances unimpeded 
by the covenants, a decision to expedite exploration or development would only be made if 
expediting these investments were to increase the estimated capital value of the project. The 
corrected sentence should read: Clearly any attempt to impose artificial schedules on 
decision makers can only create confusion, chaos and economic waste. 
                                                 
7 The surface owner’s economic interests are defined by the attainment a rate of revenue recovery that 
maximizes the present value of the royalty-receivables revenue stream. Delay only diminishes this 
present value (Brätland 2001, 694-695).  
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The conflict, ethical breeches and implied covenants devolving from current property law 
would not exist if the discovered petroleum deposit were to become the sole, exclusive 
property of the extractive enterprise making the discovery. In this latter case, ethically and 
functionally legitimate ownership would be achieved by applying the principle of ‘original 
appropriation;’ this principle would supplant the Blackstonian perspective on the scope of 
the surface owner’s property rights.8 Of course, in this situation, some consent to surface 
access would still be required from a surface owner to make exploration possible.9 Court-
imposed covenants would no longer impinge on the discovering firm’s ability to engage in 
entrepreneurial timing in the scheduling of investments in the project. In this case, the 
surface owner would have no contingent claim on production. This situation would 
represent the normative ideal from both an allocative and ethical perspective.  
Secure access to exploratory prospects is impeded that by governmental regulation and 
control of lands. While governmental constraints on land use are rationalized as actions 
required to serve the environmental interest of the public, their imposition is a key 
stumbling block to this entrepreneurial role of resource replacement. With full rights of 
private property, those parties motivated by environmental concerns could pay a 
competitive price for committing lands to alternative uses. Such parties may purchase lands 
in question or may pay owners of resource properties to refrain from exploration and 
development. In either case, the party pursuing environmental objectives would be paying 
an amount at least equal to the opportunity cost of forsaking development (von Mises 1998, 
650-651).  In essence, secure property rights are critical to a rational provision for the future.  
3. Governmental v. private entrepreneurship in infrastructure maintenance  
One of the fallacies of infrastructure maintenance is the implicit presumption that a major 
part of this infrastructure must be publicly controlled and maintained by government.10 
Having made the financial outlay for the facilities that comprise public infrastructure, 
government takes on the responsibility of maintaining public infrastructure. Unfortunately, 
there appears to be a pattern of historical inevitability to the neglect of public infrastructure 
that is endemic to its governmental provision and management. The American economist, 
Felix Rohatyn, has noted the widespread phenomenon of public infrastructure decay 
(Rohatyn 2009, 1-5). But, save for the occasional business failure, there is clearly no such 
pattern of neglect with respect to private infrastructure. What accounts for the contrast in 
patterns of maintenance? One answer may lie in the unexamined presumption that the 
                                                 
8 This proposal was first put forward by Murray Rothbard (1998 [1982], 71-72). A version of the 
Rothbard proposal has been provided by Robert Bradley (1996, 69-74). 
9 In most cases, a single surface owner would not be able to extort a royalty concession from an 
exploring entrepreneur establishing ownership of a subsurface discovery. Directional drilling would be 
permitted such that a particular subsurface structure could be accessed from a multiplicity of surface 
locations. Competition between surface owners would weaken the bargaining power of any single 
surface owner (Bradley 1996, 72).  
10 The assumption of government’s maintenance responsibility no doubt arises from the notion that the 
services these facilities yield are public goods that cannot be provided privately. However, evidence 
suggests that public infrastructure’s services can be provided through private entrepreneurial 
undertakings Niskanen 1971; Wollstein 1974; Foldvary 1993, 1–15; Rothbard 2004, 1029–41; Hoppe 
[1993] 2006, 7; Block 2009, 232).  
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facilities comprising public infrastructure can be viewed as public capital and that a 
government can act in a sufficiently unified, coordinated way to somehow mimic the action 
of private entrepreneurs in maintaining this ‘capital.’ If not, a compelling case be made that 
that this public capital should be privatized and maintained by private entrepreneurs. But a 
second answer is that legislators and bureaucrats who are instrumental in providing and 
expending funds for infrastructure maintenance may employ their own entrepreneurial 
strategies in assuring the attainment of their own career (Loasby 1976, 190). These 
entrepreneurial actions may well divert attention and resources away from infrastructure 
maintenance. These officials include legislators and bureaucrats who view their own capital 
maintenance as those entrepreneurial actions that strengthen and promote their own 
careers.  
3.1 Viability of government action to mimic entrepreneurial maintenance 
Assume that the government is able to act as a unitary entity making maintenance 
decisions with the intent of ‘maintaining total public benefits.’ The adjective ‘unitary’ is 
used here simply to mean that the government’s plans are formulated and undertaken as 
though prompted by one mind. In other words, the assumption is made that the 
government is not comprised of individual bureaucrats and legislators with self-seeking 
but frequently conflicting aspirations. Rather, the government is assumed to act in a 
unified way to maintain public infrastructure on the basis of some attempted imputation of 
the net benefits that accrue to the public.11 The emphasis on maintaining net public benefits is 
critically important because it represents the only legitimate analogue of the 
entrepreneur’s income. 
Given the above assumptions, can public infrastructure be legitimately viewed as a form of 
‘public capital?’ Is this label apt? In an economic sense, the legitimate concept of capital is 
premised on the ability of an acting entity to manage a combination of resources with the 
intent of earning an income for an enterprise as whole.12 Private property and monetary 
exchange afford the entrepreneur this ability. Hence, the aptness of the label, ‘public capital,’ 
hinges directly on the extent to which public infrastructure can be managed in a way that is 
functionally analogous to the maintaining of private capital. For the private entrepreneur, 
capital maintenance is ultimately about actions undertaken to maintain or enhance expected 
enterprise income. But what would be the counterpart of enterprise income for a 
government in attempting to establish requisite maintenance of public infrastructure?  
                                                 
11 This assumption is only made for purposes of discussion and not with the intent of defending its 
legitimacy or feasibility. The assumption represents what Ludwig von Mises refers to as 
‘hypostatization. He notes: “The worst enemy of clear thinking is the propensity to hypostatize, i.e., to 
ascribe substance or real existence to mental constructs or concepts. … Only individuals act.” See: 
Ludwig von Mises ([1962] 2006, 70-71) [1962].  
12 Joseph Schumpeter observes: “capital is then an agent in the exchange economy. A process of the 
exchange economy is given expression in the capital aspect, namely the transfer of productive means to 
the entrepreneur. There is therefore in this sense only private and no ‘social’ capital” ([1934] 1959, 122–
23). Schumpeter’s use of the word “social” in this context would be more accurately read as “public.” 
Although Schumpeter’s reference to social capital does not necessarily refer to public infrastructure as 
such, his intent is clearly to emphasize the idea that capital is inherently in the province of the 
entrepreneur who functions in an environment of private property and implied freedom of exchange. 
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Metaphorically, the income counterpart would be the total benefits yielded by all 
components of infrastructure as a totality. The maintenance issue arises from the fact that 
the benefits of infrastructure yield no appropriable sales revenue that would serve as 
guide to maintenance.13 Hence, the absence of a comprehensive and appropriable future 
monetary income means that the government is left without a unified guide in planning 
maintenance expenditures for the disparate facilities under its purview.14 The government 
is left with no means of reckoning a rational tradeoff between maintenance projects. 
Another aspect of this problem is that there is a ‘disconnect’ between marginal intended 
use of infrastructure by the public and any planned maintenance that may be considered 
by the government. Users of individual facilities in public infrastructure and the 
governmental entity responsible for maintenance are necessarily different acting entities. 
To summarize, the following inferences highlight the inability of governments to mimic 
entrepreneurial maintenance and, hence, underscore the misleading nature of the ‘public 
capital’ label for public infrastructure: 
 No non-political means are available for a government to weigh the relative tradeoffs of 
investment in new total infrastructure and maintenance of existing infrastructure as a 
whole.  
 Also, the benefits of total infrastructure maintenance are not appropriable by those 
bearing the economic burden of total outlay.  
 Means are unavailable to reckon the changing tradeoffs between current investment in 
infrastructure, as a whole, and the prospective future benefits.  
 In general, means do not exist for government decision makers to reckon the relative 
tradeoffs between maintenance of some existing facilities of public infrastructure as 
opposed to maintenance of other facilities.  
 Maintenance decisions for public infrastructure are based largely on physical 
deterioration with little rational reckoning of benefits or opportunity costs involved; the 
result is that some complementary facilities are neglected that should be maintained 
while other facilities that should be abandoned are maintained. 
As these inferences suggest, an implicit concern is the maintenance of the functional 
complementarities that exist between different components of the infrastructure. If tolls are 
not collected for each such facility, the government is left with an imputation problem that 
would tend to preclude a balanced maintenance that preserves these complementarities. No 
calculational means of charging tolls that would account for the complementarities existing 
between the services yielded by groupings of such facilities. The critical issue is the fact that 
even with the collection of user fees or tolls on some facilities, physical deterioration would 
be the only inducement for the maintaining complementarities (Brätland 2010, 41-42). 
                                                 
13 In his Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith wrestled with the practical aspects of financing and maintaining 
public infrastructure. He was well aware of the importance of privatization as a means to infrastructure 
maintenance. But Smith seems to have been unable to arrive at a consistent and coherent perspective 
with respect to public policy. In having discussed the requisite incentives for maintenance achievable by 
privatizing a canal in France, he then proceeded to discuss the incentives for neglect that would be 
consequent to a similar policy with respect to ‘high roads’ in England (Smith 1982 [1976], 724).  
14 While in some narrow instances, tolls can be collected for marginal use of some facilities, the problem 
of imputing maintenance tradeoffs for all components of public infrastructure still remains.  
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Hence, there is no reason to believe that government could ever mimic the actions of private 
entrepreneurs in the maintenance of infrastructure.  
3.2 Neglect arising from bureaucratic and political entrepreneurship  
If governments, considered as institutions, are unable act as unified decision making entities 
in maintaining infrastructure, how effective are the actions of individual legislators and 
bureaucrats in achieving this objective? Evidence suggests that legislators and bureaucrats 
act in an entrepreneurial manner in fostering their own careers (Brätland 2010, 42-43). In 
other words, for legislators and bureaucrats, careers become the capital they maintain or 
enhance by the personal strategies they pursue. But what are the consequences of such 
behavior for the maintenance of infrastructure? Since bureaucratic and political 
entrepreneurs are endemic to the workings of government institutions, the maintenance of 
bureaucratic and political capital becomes a source of infrastructure neglect.  
 Perverse consequences of political entrepreneurship by legislators  
For the legislator, entrepreneurship refers to the time-structured strategies employed in 
pursuit of political careers. “Capital maintenance,” in this context, refers to the actions that 
legislators take to maintain their power, influence, and job satisfaction. In maintaining this 
metaphorical capital, legislators may direct their actions toward objectives largely or totally 
divorced from public-infrastructure maintenance. In their pursuit of personally chosen ends, 
they must husband tools or metaphorical capital goods to implement their plans. The 
metaphorical capital goods that legislators must employ depend directly on the respective 
constituencies they must serve and on their own career objectives. These capital goods may 
be intangibles that involve subjective judgments about the future actions required to achieve 
career ends.  
Neglect of public infrastructure may arise from the legislator’s failure to consider the 
complementarities between the two political capital goods—power and re-electability 
(Brätland 2010, 45). This neglect may be reflected in the legislator’s failure to assure budget 
funding for the maintenance of existing public infrastructure in his district. For example, 
such neglect may be prompted by a legislator’s focus on the construction of new 
infrastructure. Although the legislator may neglect budget funding for existing 
infrastructure maintenance, he may have established sufficient power and re-electability to 
remain in office and pursue legislative objectives unrelated to infrastructure maintenance. 
But such neglect may also arise from the legislator’s shortage of power, reflecting his failure 
or inability to generate support in the legislature for budgets that will finance infrastructure 
maintenance in his home district. This power shortage may be manifested in a failed 
logrolling negotiation or a lack of sufficiently strong alliances in the legislature. The 
consequence may be the neglect of highways, streets, sewerage systems, and bridges in the 
legislator’s home district. If the legislator lacks seniority in the legislature, this neglect may 
occur even though he is a well-intentioned champion of efforts to maintain these 
infrastructure facilities. 
A legislator’s time preference is also critical in the timing and allocation of his two political 
capital goods—power and re-electability. One consequence is that any time structured 
resource allocation for maintenance that derives from his actions may be totally divorced 
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from any time cycle of deterioration or loss in usability that the public infrastructure 
facilities may experience (Brätland 2010, 46). Hence, in the absence of an overt threat to his 
reelection, the legislator’s actions over time may well result in chronic neglect of such 
facilities. 
 Bureaucratic entrepreneurship as source of infrastructure neglect  
Like political capital, bureaucratic capital is a metaphor that can shed light on public 
officials’ entrepreneurial actions or inaction over the course of time. The entrepreneurial 
bureaucrat of concern here is the senior executive with some direct or indirect responsibility 
for public infrastructure and with the power to affect how a bureau allocates its resources. 
As in the case of the legislator whose capital takes the form of a career, in this case the 
metaphorical capital in question is the bureaucrat’s career. The bureaucrat’s view of his 
career may take into account several subjectively defined sources of appeal.15 In any case, 
the career is the overarching metaphorical capital that governs the bureaucrat’s 
entrepreneurial actions and the use of the resources at his disposal. This metaphorical 
capital suggests a time structure of maintenance that may be at odds with concerns over the 
maintenance of public infrastructure.  
Although the bureaucrat is not an elected official, he must realistically face his own 
benefactors, constituencies, and power blocs in managing the capital defined by his own 
career aspirations. These parties include: appointing officials to whom the bureaucrat 
reports; sponsoring legislators; subordinates in the bureau;16 that segment of the public most 
sensitive to the bureau’s activities (that is, self-selected “stakeholders”); and prospective 
future nongovernmental employers. The latter group in this list would especially concern 
appointed executive bureaucrats whose long-term career objectives may lie outside of 
government.17 The bureaucrat’s ability to deal with and satisfy these constituencies’ 
determines the nature of the metaphorical capital goods he must employ in managing the 
capital represented by his own career. 
What are these metaphorical capital goods? The question pertains to the resources he must 
employ to succeed. The capital goods required to give the bureaucrat at least the appearance 
of success include: (1) budgets, (2) reputation, and (3) control. Although these aspects of 
                                                 
15 William Niskanen mentions salary, perquisites of office, public reputation, power, patronage, the 
bureau’s output, ease of making changes, and ease of managing the bureau (1971, 38). Anthony Downs 
gives a similar list, including power, income, prestige, security, convenience, loyalty, pride in work, and 
desire to serve the public interest (1967, 2). Both of these economists take a rather static approach to 
defining the arguments of a utility function in that they do not emphasize the time-structured strategies 
that may define the bureaucrat’s actions. 
16 Although the bureaucrat has managerial authority over subordinates, he is unlikely to experience 
sustained success in his position if he ignores the career aspirations of those under his organizational 
control. 
17 James Q. Wilson observes that the appointed bureaucrat’s career may involve relatively brief stints in 
a particular government position. For the executive bureaucrat, longer-term career goals would no 
doubt involve employment in the private sector and perhaps in academic institutions. Even though the 
appointed official’s actions may not directly affect the interests of such prospective employers, the 
official must at the same time be sensitive to reputational issues connected with his actions in public 
office (1989, 209). 
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employment do not necessarily include everything that the bureaucrat might want in a 
particular governmental position, they comprise the resources required to establish the 
appearance of success. These metaphorical capital goods present the bureaucrat with both 
complementarities and trade-offs in defining and constraining the actions that best enhance 
his longer-term career aspirations (Brätland 2010, 46-47). In considering these actions, how 
will infrastructure maintenance weigh into the bureaucrat’s employment of these 
metaphorical capital goods? The bureaucrat will employ these capital goods to foster the 
maintenance of public infrastructure if such action maintains or enhances the prospects of 
attaining the goals that define his career ambitions. Otherwise, passive neglect of 
infrastructure may well be ‘rational’ for the bureaucrat. 
But there would be mitigating concerns for the bureaucratic entrepreneur. The bureaucrat 
must be sensitive to the general public in considering programs of infrastructure 
maintenance that the bureau might undertake. Infrastructure neglect might conceivably 
draw unfavorable press, affecting the bureaucrat’s reputation among the general public. 
However, unless the affected infrastructure involves roads or bridges, public reaction to 
neglect may well be tepid or nonexistent. In short, given the bureaucrat’s possible 
motivations, larger government and expanding public budgets do not necessarily imply the 
availability of more resources for maintenance of depreciating infrastructure. If the relative 
neglect of infrastructure occurs without significant negative feedback from the public, the 
bureaucrat may perceive greater career advantage in pursuing ventures that are more likely 
to draw favorable reaction from appointing officials and sponsoring legislators. For 
example, new infrastructure may offer the bureaucrat more reputation-enhancing ways of 
dealing with his constituencies.  
Although new infrastructure projects find favor with the constituencies that the bureaucrat 
must please, they tend to crowd out funding for maintenance of existing infrastructure. The 
bureaucrat may not be particularly concerned with the net social benefits of one 
infrastructure project as opposed to another competing project (Brätland 2010, 48). He will 
not reckon opportunity costs in terms of forgone or relinquished social benefits associated 
with another, competing project. Moreover, as he chooses his action, he is unlikely to 
employ a planning horizon congruent with the realization of any benefits afforded by 
publicly supported maintenance projects. 
3.3 The possible role of private entrepreneurs in maintaining infrastructure  
Entrepreneurial privatization of infrastructure would have several implicitly interrelated but 
critically distinct features. For example, entrepreneurial enterprises would not be dependent 
on the vagaries of governmental appropriations in attempting to allocate investment funds 
for maintenance of facilities. Also, private enterprises would not have maintenance plans 
stifled by officials beholding to political pressures and aspirations of public officials. Choices 
between competing investments in infrastructure would not be prompted by the influences 
of certain politically powerful constituencies. Moreover, schedules of infrastructure 
maintenance would not be disrupted by the legislative and bureaucratic delays common in 
political decision-making. 
We can glean an important insight into public-infrastructure maintenance from the process 
by which a business firm maintains its own infrastructure. Private property and monetary 
exchange would enable the entrepreneurial enterprise to use market prices to subjectively 
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evaluate the prospective opportunity costs and benefits associated with alternative 
schedules of maintenance for its privatized infrastructure facilities.18 Implicit in this 
reckoning would be the entrepreneur’s ability to distinguish capital and income. Income is a 
way of looking at capital in terms of its expected return over the entrepreneur’s planning 
time horizon. At the same time, capital, as the enterprise’s judgment of net present worth, is 
a way of looking at the totality of future income from the point of view of the entrepreneur’s 
reaction to market uncertainty and of his time preference, or rate of discount. For the 
enterprise, income would be the amount that could be consumed within a definite period 
without lowering the expected or desired investment worth of capital as reckoned by the 
entrepreneurial enterprise (Friedman 1957, 10; von Mises [1949] 1998, 261; Hayek [1941] 
2007, 277–78). 
For the entrepreneurial enterprise, investment in maintenance would not necessarily be 
focused on particular resources, but rather on how the entire complementary combination of 
facilities would affect the enterprise’s profitability (Mathews 1996, 88-90). The resources at 
the business entrepreneur’s disposal would be capital goods that could take the form of 
buildings, equipment, tools, goods of any kind and order, claims, receivables, cash reserves 
(von Mises [1949] 1998, 262). The critical distinction is that specific infrastructure facilities 
(its capital goods) would not in themselves constitute capital, and their existence would not 
necessarily assure income or imply anything with respect to their maintenance of affected 
facilities. These things would become an aspect of capital only when they were owned, 
deployed, and maintained in the coherent pursuit of a single, unified plan undertaken by a 
specific entrepreneurial enterprise. Hence, for the enterprise, capital would emerge as the 
entrepreneurial reckoning of the net present monetary worth of its own plan to employ its 
own facilities (Lachmann [1956] 1978, 13). 
Within this calculational context, the entrepreneurial enterprise would be able to make rational 
choices to maintain its capital as reflected in changes in the enterprise’s prospective worth. 
Hence, for the entrepreneurial enterprise, depreciation would be always a matter of 
entrepreneurial judgment with respect to its effect on future capitalized income (Lachmann 
1986, 66–67; Osterfeld 1992, 23–30). Maintenance of capital would focus on a desired stream of 
future income. Therefore, depreciation would always be judged within the context of the 
complementarities between various facilities. Maintenance decisions would always be on a 
facility’s effectiveness in serving the complementary function of attaining the desired level of 
current and future profitability. Each maintenance decision ultimately would relate to the most 
profitable complementarity within a chosen combination of facilities employed in pursuing an 
entrepreneurial plan (Hayek [1941] 2007, 277-282; Lachmann 1986, 63; von Mises [1949] 1998, 
512). Hence, with respect to maintenance, the privatization of infrastructure would have the 
following implicitly interrelated but critically distinct features: 
 Prospective monetary benefits of maintenance would be appropriable by the 
entrepreneurial enterprises undertaking the maintenance of the infrastructure facilities 
that it owns (that is, costs and monetary benefits would be borne by the same entity). 
                                                 
18 The task of economic calculation for the individual, according to Mises, “is to adjust his actions as 
well as possible to his present opinion concerning want satisfaction in the future.” Mises also notes: 
“The question . . . is whether a certain course of conduct increases or decreases the productivity of our 
future exertions” ([1949] 1998, 232, 511). 
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 Business entrepreneurs would be able to evaluate the anticipated, yet uncertain, 
monetary trade-offs between current investments in maintenance and the desired 
future income return earned by providing infrastructure services. 
 The entrepreneurial enterprises would be able to integrate plans for the maintenance of 
their infrastructure facilities into a comprehensive business plan focused on the 
maintenance of a desired time profile of future net revenue earned from the provision 
of services (Hayek [1941] 2007, 277). 
 Physical deterioration of a particular infrastructure facility would be of concern only to 
the extent that the enterprise judged it to reduce the future monetary income yielded by 
the complementary combination of facilities that it owns. 
 Business entrepreneurs would be able to rank maintenance priorities and assess the 
extent to which total revenue productivity of its infrastructure facilities as a 
complementary combination is affected. 
 Maintenance plans for particular facilities would be unique to individual 
entrepreneurial enterprises, reflecting the enterprise’s market expectations and the 
particular complementarities that would be sought in its chosen combinations of 
infrastructure facilities. 
 Because maintenance would be tied to a monetary income, the enterprise would be able 
to link its maintenance investments to the demand for its infrastructure services as 
expressed by its transactions with customers (Lachmann 1986, 67–71). 
Privately held infrastructure would be maintained by profitable entrepreneurial business 
enterprises that own them. With the elements of public infrastructure in private hands, 
entrepreneurial owners would be able derive an income stream from the provision of their 
services? Maintenance of this privatized income stream would constitute capital 
maintenance for the firms owning infrastructure facilities. Individual entrepreneurial 
enterprises owning infrastructure would be acting on their own behalf but in the process 
would be serving the interest of society as a whole in undertaking the maintenance of its 
own capital. These judgments of entrepreneurial success would be made with a degree of 
rationality that would be impossible in the absence of private property and monetary 
exchange. The success of private-infrastructure maintenance would be reckoned only in the 
context of individual entrepreneurial efforts to profitably serve users of owned 
infrastructure facilities. Hence, the success of infrastructure maintenance would be a 
judgment that each enterprise would make in assessing the profitability of its own business 
plan. 
4. Conclusion 
Resource exhaustion and infrastructure neglect are perennial social concerns that do not 
have workable governmental solutions. However, the institutions most capable of dealing 
with these issues are to be found in the incentives that are faced by private entrepreneurs 
availed of privatized resources. Extractive resource renewal and infrastructure maintenance 
are activities that could become routine by according private entrepreneurs a less regulated 
role in societal provision for the future. For extractive enterprises, the entrepreneurial efforts 
to maintain capital could result in the systematic and orderly replacement of exhausting 
resources. However, this process is stymied by the institutional constraints imposed by 
government. These institutional constraints include foreclosure of land access, regulatory 
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encumbrances to entrepreneurial management of resources, and, in the case of petroleum, 
an inability to acquire full property rights in resources discovered by the entrepreneurial 
enterprise. While the entrepreneur is crucial to warding off resource exhaustion, these 
impediments mean that the entrepreneur’s role in resource replacement is only partially 
fulfilled.  
Neglect of what is labeled public infrastructure seems to be endemic to government’s 
assumed responsibility with respect to maintenance. First the absence of secure ownership 
rights and the nonexistence of an integrated revenue stream from the sale of services mean 
that governments are unable to mimic the actions of private entrepreneurs in maintaining 
capital through the maintenance of private infrastructure. The reason is that although public 
infrastructure ostensibly yields benefits, the absence of secure ownership and an integrated 
income stream mean that governments cannot implement a coherent program of 
maintenance as could be implemented by the private entrepreneur. Second, career oriented 
entrepreneurial behavior on the part of legislators and bureaucrats undermine the 
governmental function of maintaining infrastructure. While maintenance of public 
infrastructure may, in some instances, be congruent with the career aspirations of legislators 
and bureaucrats, other goals may intervene in the allocation of public funds.  
Governmental failures with respect to infrastructure maintenance offer grounds for privatizing 
what has been public infrastructure. As private property, the services of infrastructure would 
be marketed thus placing the process of maintenance under the discipline of entrepreneurial 
capital maintenance. The marketing of infrastructure services would allow the owning 
enterprise to focus on the maintenance of an integrated income stream.  
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